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- From: hagerp@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu (Paul Hager)
- Date: 2 Oct 91 04:45:22 GMT
- Newsgroups: alt.drugs,talk.politics.drugs
- Subject: ICLU talk and companion notes
-
-
- The Drug War and the Constitution
- by Paul Hager
-
- Following is a transcript of the speech I gave at the
- ICLU Conference. I am appending the companion notes to the
- end. Text between brackets [] is description or commentary
- and not part of the actual transcript.
-
- -----------------------begin speech-------------------------
-
- I'd like to draw your attention to companion notes that I
- put together for this talk. They're located on the tables out
- back there, and I think that those of you who are doing CLE have
- them in your manuals.
-
- Well, I'm going to attempt to descend into the murky depths
- of political philosophy and Constitutional analysis. At the
- outset, I do have a caveat: the arguments I am going to be
- presenting have never been endorsed by Congress or the courts and
- I hope that during the question and answer session we can get
- into this in a little bit more detail.
-
- The thesis that I want to advance today is that the drug war
- and the laws that prohibit the private consumption of certain
- drugs are un-Constitutional. Prohibition laws, themselves,
- violate every tenet of limited government that is embodied in our
- Constitution.
-
- To begin, let me pose a question: why was it necessary to
- amend the Constitution in order to prohibit the drug alcohol?
- And, while you are cogitating on that: how is it possible to
- prohibit other drugs without going through the formal amendment
- process? Well, I think, in order to answer these questions, it's
- necessary to take a look at what the Constitution is supposed to
- be.
-
- At the recent confirmation hearings of Judge Clarence Thomas
- (uh, Clarence Thomas, by the way, -- he and I have at least two
- things in common: we're both ex marijuana users [chuckles from
- the audience], and we're both married to attorneys) -- in any
- case, there was a lot of discussion at the hearings about natural
- law and natural rights. Just about all of the participants
- seemed to agree that our system recognizes the existence of
- "inalienable" natural rights and that government exists to
- "secure" those rights for its citizens. It's just as well that
- they agreed on that -- the architects of our system of
- government, in fact, had that principle in mind, and they viewed
- the Constitution as being a blueprint for a limited government in
- which those powers that were to be made available to the federal
- government would be listed. If a power is not listed in the
- Constitution, it is not supposed to be available to the Federal
- government. Two hundred odd years ago, when the Bill of Rights
- -- which we're here to celebrate -- was being debated, there were
- those who opposed the Bill of Rights on the grounds that, uh,
- they're completely unnecessary. It's redundant -- the rights
- already exist and therefore they don't have a place in the the
- Constitution. In fact, they made the argument that a Bill of
- Rights is dangerous because at some future point in time, people
- would get the idea that if a right wasn't to be found in the
- Constitution -- like privacy -- it did not exist. Perhaps the
- best articulation I've ever seen of this principle is to be found
- in _The Federalist Papers_. [I hold up a paperback of _The
- Federalist Papers_.] Alexander Hamilton writing in Federalist
- number 84 -- and I'll just read some of this out to you. He
- says:
-
- "... bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in
- which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in
- the proposed constitution, but would even be dangerous."
-
- And then his argument is:
-
- "For why declare that things shall not be done which there
- is no power to do? Why for instance, should it be said,
- that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when
- no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I
- will not contend that such a provision would confer a
- regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish,
- to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming
- that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason,
- that the constitution ought not to be charged with the
- absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority,
- which was not given, and that the provision against
- restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear
- implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations
- concerning it, was intended to be vested in the national
- government. This", he concluded, "may serve as a specimen
- of the numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine
- of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious
- zeal for bills of rights."
-
- Good writer, Mr. Hamilton. [I gestured with the book and put it
- aside.] Well, anyway, as we know, Hamilton's view did not
- prevail and 10 of the 12 Amendments that were proposed as a Bill
- of Rights were ratified in December of 1791.
-
- In order to mollify critics and meet the arguments of people
- like Hamilton, language was added to the Bill of Rights to
- address this idea of limited government and natural rights.
-
- I just happen to have a copy of the Constitution here --
- don't leave home without it [I hold up my pocket copy of the
- Constitution]-- and I'll read the language that bears on this.
-
- "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall
- not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by thepeople."
-
- That's the 9th Amendment, this lays out that whole idea of rights
- existing apart from the Constitution.
-
- And then we have:
-
- "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
- Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
- reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
-
- That's the 10th Amendment and that has to do with delegation of
- powers and the idea of limited government.
-
- Well, let's go back to those questions. I think the answer
- to the first question is fairly straightforward -- this idea of
- alcohol prohibition. We were talking about a new power that was
- being acquired -- surrendered by the people and the states -- and
- so the 18th Amendment was passed to give that power to the
- Federal government. In the case of our second question --
- prohibitting other drugs -- I would argue that we are talking
- about new powers being granted to the Federal government that
- have never been surrendered by the people and the states. Ergo,
- the drug war, prohibition laws, the DEA, the whole ball of wax,
- are all unconstitutional. I think what we have here is a prime
- example of the illegal acquistion of powers by a central
- government through a process of slow accretion. And this was
- exactly the sort of thing Hamilton was warning against back in
- 1787.
-
- If it is the case the federal government can't get involved
- in the prohibition business, what about the state governments?
- Uh, I think one answer to this is to look at the right of privacy
- which is protected by the 9th Amendment and extended to the
- states by the 14th. The right has been invoked to protect
- privacy in such areas as family planning -- birth control -- and,
- at least so far, the right of privacy seems to be protecting a
- woman's choice whether or not to have an abortion. Furthermore,
- this same right should apply in matters involving an individual's
- decision to consume, privately, a recreational drug in his or her
- home.
-
- One argument that might militate against this idea of a
- right of privacy taking precedence might be -- uh, well, what if
- the people who use drugs are infringing on the rights of other
- people. For example, users of cocaine and opiates. Is there a
- compelling state interest -- is there some kind of balancing test
- that we can apply that gives the state the right to intervene?
- I'd like to pose a hypothetical here that we can use for the
- purposes of analysis. Let's posit the existance of a drug that
- is 100% addicting and potentiates violence in its users 100% of
- the time. I think we'd have a very clear case of there being a
- compelling state interest to get itself involved in prohibitting
- this drug on the grounds that the state is protecting the rights
- of the non-users. Well, suppose we begin reducing those
- percentages. Let's suppose that we're talking about a drug that
- is 15% addictive and potentiates violence in some lesser
- percentage of its users. We have an empirical answer for that:
- I've just described alcohol. And, just for another for instance,
- let's suppose that we have a drug that is 90% addictive but
- doesn't seem to correlate with violence at all. Again,
- empirically we have an answer: I've just described cigarettes.
-
- I would argue that pharmacological and population data can
- be adduced to compare alcohol and tobacco with other drugs like
- opiates and cocaine derivitives. And, if we do this, we find
- that alcohol is, in fact, more addictive than many forms of
- opiates and many forms of cocaine although less addictive than
- crack cocaine. Furthermore, smoked tobacco is generally
- recognized as being the most addictive drug around. That other
- area, having to do with violence and anti-social behavior, once
- again we find that the drug that is the greatest potentiator of
- violent behavior is alcohol. And if we look at the other drugs
- like opiates and cocaine, we find that most of the violence that
- is associated with these drugs is associated with the black
- market/organized crime component of the drug trade and is not a
- pharmacological feature of the drug itself.
-
- Well, I'm the political coordinator of the Hoosier Cannabis
- Re-legalization Coalition, and I haven't said a word about
- marijuana yet and I probably should -- uh -- marijuana, which is
- the Nation's number one illegal drug, which is estimated to have
- been used by over 60 million people, is recognized as being
- relatively non-addictive. For a point of comparison, if we look
- at the common drug caffeine -- which I was dosing myself with
- earlier today -- caffeine, which is in coffee and softdrinks, is
- generally recognized as being more addictive than marijuana.
- Furthermore, no scientific evidence has ever been brought forth
- that would support the idea that marijuana leads to violent,
- anti-social behavior. Thus, by no stretch of the imagination is
- there a rational or scientific justification for marijuana
- prohibition and, perforce, there is no marijuana prohibition law
- that passes Constitutional muster. Moreover, using alcohol and
- tobacco as our metrics, even heroin and crack prohibition cannot
- be justified.
-
- At this point, it's probably time to boldly go where no
- Constitutional interpreter has gone before and so I'm going to
- move into more speculative areas. The 1st Amendment, which
- protects religion and speech, I think also by extension protects
- thought and belief. Well, what is the seat of religion, thought
- and belief? [A pregnant pause.] The brain, right? [Tapping my
- cranium.] In fact, speech and belief are manifestations of the
- internal state of a person's brain. Science is beginning to
- inform us as to how chemicals and neurotransmitters, indeed the
- physical "wiring" of our brain defines who we are and how we
- think. Unless we get involved in metaphysics I think we have to
- recognize that there is physical basis for belief. Where I'm
- heading with this is that, if it is the case that your physical
- brain state determines whether you are a Methodist, an agnostic,
- or a Nazi then clearly the state of your brain is protected in
- some sense. The question I'd like to put to you is: if it is the
- case that the 1st Amendment allows a person to alter his or her
- cognitive system by reading "Mein Kampf" -- which might well
- alter it permanently, you might become a Nazi for the rest of
- your life -- then how is it possible for the government to step
- in and say that a person may not temporarily alter his or her
- cognitive system for two or three hours by smoking a marijuana
- joint? [Scattered applause.] Also, another way of looking at
- this same thing is, what is the rationale for saying that
- programming your brain across the visual or aural pathways is OK
- but programming your brain _chemically_ across the blood-brain
- barrier is not?
-
- And finally -- uh, and I think that this is the most
- frightening prospect in this whole thing -- consider this: if a
- state government can come up to you and can say, you may not pass
- delta-9-THC -- the principal intoxicant in marijuana -- you
- cannot pass that across your blood-brain barrier, what is to
- prevent a state from saying at some point in the future, you
- _must_ pass drug X -- let's call it soma like in _Brave New
- World_ -- you must pass soma across your blood-brain barrier? I
- guess what I'm arguing is that the government has intruded into
- your biochemical and physiological brain and in principle, once
- the government can do this, then in principle the government can
- control any part of your body.
-
- I think I've just abrout wrapped up the general comments I
- wanted to make. One thing I might suggest: we might also talk
- about some specific areas where government has been in violation
- of Constitutional rights all at the behest of this drug war.
-
- Thank you.
-
- ---------------------companion notes to talk-------------------
-
- The Drug War and the Constitution
- by Paul Hager
-
- Companion Notes
-
- By focusing on the Constitutional dimension of drug
- _prohibition_, I've attempted to approach the issue from a
- different perspective. In claiming that the drug war and drug
- prohibition violate the U.S. Constitution and fundamental
- principles of civil liberty I am aware that there is a dearth of
- present day case law to support my arguments. Instead, I have
- relied on the writings of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay in The
- Federalist Papers and, to a lesser extent, selected writings of
- Thomas Jefferson that appear in Jefferson: Writings (Merrill D.
- Peterson wrote the notes and selected text, ISBN 0-940450-16-X).
- I assert that current prohibitionist policy entails a grant of
- power to government that was never contemplated and was, in fact,
- explicitly rejected by the framers of the Constitution.
-
- The Harrison Act of 1914 was the first major step by the
- Federal government in the direction of drug prohibition. The
- 18th Amendment and the enabling legislation of the Volsted Act
- were to come later, in 1919 and 1920 respectively. An excellent
- analysis of the case law interpreting the Harrison Act is to be
- found in Arnold S. Trebach's book, The Heroin Solution (Yale
- University Press, 1982, ISBN 0-300-02773-7), chapter 6. For a
- short overview of drug prohibition "cycles" in U.S. History, and
- the place of the Harrison Act in them, see "Opium, Cocaine, and
- Marijuana in American History", by David F. Musto, Scientific
- American, July 1991, volume 265, number 1.
-
- An excellent source on the "heroin problem" and possible
- solutions is The Hardest Drug: Heroin and Public Policy , by John
- Kaplan (University of Chicago Press, 1983, ISBN 0-226-42427-8).
- Professor Kaplan devotes the first two chapters of the book to
- exploding the myths about heroin's addictiveness and dangers that
- have been used to justify its prohibition. Kaplan also argues
- that the Harrison Act was in large part responsible for the
- development of many of the social problems that we now associate
- with heroin use and considers the Act to have been a mistake.
- Unaccountably (given the foundation he lays), Kaplan shies away
- from legalization strategies completely and offers heroin
- maintenance programs with possible coercive treatment as his
- alternative to the present approach. Arnold Trebach, on the
- other hand, argues in his book that doctors should be allowed to
- prescribe heroin to addicts as needed and to include heroin in
- their pharmacopoeia. Trebach's legal analysis of the Harrison
- Act (mentioned above) is used to buttress his argument in favor
- of a liberal interpretion of the Act. Interestingly, Kaplan, who
- considers the Act to have been a mistake, favors a much more
- restrictive solution than does Trebach who considers the Harrison
- Act to have been an appropriate piece of social engineering.
-
- On the subject of marijuana, John Kaplan is also the author
- of a book entitled Marijuana -- the New Prohibition (1970).
- Kaplan argued convicingly for marijuana decriminalization in this
- book. Arnold Trebach is currently the head of the Drug Policy
- Foundation, an organization that seeks alternatives to the drug
- war. The organization generally favors full legalization of
- marijuana but embraces a variety of opinion regarding changes in
- the legal status of other drugs.
-
- The issue of "addictiveness" of drugs is complicated. The
- term itself has fallen into disfavor among the scientific
- establishment and "drug dependence" is generally preferred. I
- will stick with the more common term for simplicity. It turns
- out that the picture of addiction that is a favorite with police
- departments and drug czars is far from accurate. In "The Tragedy
- of Needless Pain", (by Ronald Melzack, February 1990, Scientific
- American), scientific evidence is presented that morphine used
- for pain relief is not addictive. Trebach notes statistics that
- gave a rate of 500,000 heroin addicts and 3,500,000 "chippers" or
- non-addicted occasional users in the late 1970's which would mean
- a 12.5% addiction rate. Laboratory studies show a higher rate
- but these studies use medical grade, pure heroin. In Health
- Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction (Surgeon General's
- Report, 1988), a comparison is made of the relative addictiveness
- of smoked tobacco and several other drugs (the 15% figure for
- alcohol comes from this source). The Surgeon General's Report
- observes that of service men who became addicted to heroin in
- Vietnam, aproximatedly 90% were able to avoid readdiction upon
- return to the U.S. The report also mentions the frequency of
- "chipping" in heroin use but notes that nonaddicted cigarette
- users are exceedingly rare. The addiction rate of 90% for
- cigarette smokers also derives from the Surgeon General's Report.
-
- Other sources that give some picture of comparative
- addiction include "Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs,
- Consequences, and Alternatives" by Ethan Nadelmann (Science,
- September 1, 1989). In building his case for drug legalization,
- Nadelmann cites National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) research
- that gives a surprisingly low value for cocaine addiction rates.
- A more complete comparision of addictive potentional is to be
- found in the magazine, In Health, in an article entitled "Hooked,
- not Hooked" by Deborah Franklin (Nov/Dec 1990). Franklin cites
- addiction experts' rankings of various legal and illegal drugs as
- follows (p. 41):
-
- 1) Nicotine
- 2) "Ice" (smoked methamphetamine)
- 3) Crack
- 4) Crystal Meth (injected methamphetamine)
- 5) Valium (diazepam)
- 6-8) Quaalude
- 6-8) Seconal (secobarbital)
- 6-8) Alcohol
- 9-10) Crank (snorted methamphetamine)
- 9-10) Heroin
- 11) Cocaine
- 12) Caffeine
- 13) PCP
- 14) Marijuana
- 15) Ecstasy (MDMA)
- 16-18) Psilocybin Mushrooms
- 16-18) LSD
- 16-18) Mescaline
-
- (The rankings as they appear in the magazine are in the form of a
- bar graph -- I've converted them to a rank ordering. Note also
- that, although amphetamine is broken down according to the method
- of administration, other drugs with multiple modes of
- administration are not. I.V. injection will, for a number of
- reasons, be more addicting than oral ingestion. Concentration is
- also an important factor as well. Although the "potency" of
- heroin is considered to be 3 to 4 times that of morphine, heroin
- is actually diacetylmorphine -- morphine reacted with acetic
- anhydride. In the body, heroin breaks down to morphine in order
- to produce its effect. Apparently, the "potency" of heroin is
- the result of the ease with which heroin crosses the blood-brain
- barrier before it breaks down to morphine.)
-
- The Drug Policy Letter, Vol II, number 2, Mar/Apr 1990 (a
- newsletter published by the Drug Policy Foundation) uses a back-
- of-the-envelope calculation to expose the myth that "crack is the
- most addictive drug known to man." It is often said that if one
- uses crack just once, a person is addicted. According to the
- NIDA-sponsored National Household Survey, 2.5 million people have
- tried crack, and 480,000 used it in the month prior to the
- survey. Even if one assumed that anyone who used the drug in the
- past month was an addict, that would still give an addiction rate
- of only 19%. Using this same method for alcohol would give a 62%
- rate and, for powdered cocaine a 13% addiction rate. Though this
- is not the sort of analysis that should be used to gauge
- addiction rates, it does give the lie to the "one puff and you're
- hooked" claim.
-
- A number of the sources cited above present evidence that
- violent criminal activity associated with heroin and cocaine use
- is actually the result of the high cost of the drugs coupled with
- the low socio-economic status of inner-city addicts. In other
- words, violent crime is not a pharmacological feature of the drug
- itself but a reflection of black market economics. The same Drug
- Policy Letter cited above also reports on research done by
- Goldstein, Brownstein, Ryan, and Bellucci on the drug component
- of violence in New York City. They found that only a very small
- proportion of drug-related murders were a function of the drug
- itself and most of those were caused by alcohol. Heroin and
- other opiates, in particular, are well known to not provoke
- aggressive or violent behavior in people under the influence.
-
- Two monographs by Professor Bruce L. Benson and Professor
- David W. Rasmussen of the Policy Sciences Program of Florida
- State University in Tallahassee give another view of drug use and
- violent crime from the perspective of incarceration rates in
- Florida. Benson and Rasmussen find that the overwhelming number
- of people who have been arrested for a drug offense have no
- arrest history for a violent or property crime. (See "Drug
- Offenders in Florida", July 1990, and "Drug Crime and Florida's
- Criminal Justice Problem", December 1990.) This is not the
- result one would expect if the drug-violent crime connection were
- as intertwined as apologists for the drug war would have us
- believe.
-
- Notes on Additional Materials
-
- Along with these notes, I'm including two additional items.
- The first is "Marijuana Myths", a collection of some typical
- anti-marijuana and D.A.R.E. Program falsehoods and their
- refutation. Each of the numbered refutation sections has an
- associated reference section which will allow readers to check my
- sources. The second item is Report #126 of the ABA Law Student
- Division which recommended that the ABA reverse its 18 year
- position favoring marijuana decriminalization. Report #126
- offers no references of any kind, scientific or otherwise. This
- is understandable because most of its assertions are without
- scientific foundation. If this represents the sort of evidence
- that is considered acceptable for a major policy reversal of the
- ABA, I believe it reflects badly on the level of scholarship
- practiced by the national organization.
-
- One item that appears in #126 deserves a comment. Much is
- made of the increased potency of marijuana. In the Journal of
- Psychoactive Drugs, Vol. 20(1), Jan-Mar 1988, Tod Mikuriya, M.D.
- and Michael Aldrich, Ph.D. address this matter in "Cannabis 1988
- Old Drug, New Dangers The Potency Question." In a careful piece
- of research, Mikuriya and Aldrich demonstrate that a review of
- independent, contemporary assays of imported marijuana from the
- early 70's show it was every bit as potent as modern domestic
- sensimilla varieties. (Anyone who has personal experience with
- Thai Sticks, Panama Red, and Oaxacan in the period from the late
- 60's to early 70's can attest to the potency of the imports.)
- They also reveal that improper DEA and police evidence handling
- techniques (e.g., no refrigeration of seized marijuana) led to an
- underestimate of street potency in the 1970s because samples
- degraded rather quickly in evidence warehouses. Besides the
- country's illicit experience with marijuana, Mikurya and Aldrich
- point to the extremely potent forms of cannabis (i.e., marijuana)
- tonics that were in common use in the United States prior to
- marijuana prohibition in the 1930's. Such tonics were frequently
- given to children with no reported ill effects. Eli-Lilly and
- Parke, Davis, & Co. entered into a "joint" venture to produce a
- potent strain of domestic cannabis sativa for their cannabis
- pharmaceuticals which they called cannabis americana (note: a
- picture of the 1929 Parke-Davis catalogue for "Cannabis U.S.P."
- can be found on page 113 of Dr. Andrew Weil's book, Chocolate to
- Morphine: Understanding Mind-Active Drugs, written with Winifred
- Rosen, 1983, ISBN 0-395-33108-0). Parke-Davis claimed uniform
- effectiveness for their cannabis extract at a 10 milligram dose
- level (the effective dose of pure delta-9-THC, the main
- cannabinoid, is between 25 and 50 micrograms per kilogram). For
- those who appreciate irony, take note that Parke-Davis, which
- used to make a profit from selling legal cannabis, now makes
- money from marketing drug testing kits which primarily detect
- marijuana use.
- --
- paul hager hagerp@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu
- _Abstainer_, n. A weak person who yields to the temptation of denying
- himself a pleasure. A total abstainter is one who abstains from
- everything but abstention, and especially from activity in the affairs
- of others. from _The Devil's Dictionary_ by Ambrose Bierce
-
-